Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal Appeals Judge in the Information Age by Selya, Bruce M.
Publish and Perish: The Fate of the Federal
Appeals Judge in the Information Age
HON. BRUCE M. SELYA*
The legal career of one of my most distinguished colleagues, Bailey
Aldrich, has very nearly spanned a legal millennium. His name first appeared
in the Federal Reporter in 1939,1 and I have every hope and expectation that
his opinions will grace the corresponding pages of the third edition of the
Federal Reporter-a milestone which is fast upon us. The next legal
millennium, at current rates of publication, will fall about the same time that
my grandson, Brad Sherman, now still in diapers, will be pondering the
decision to attend law school. And if recent trends continue, the time is not too
far distant when the partnership track at major law firms will exceed in
duration one full iteration of the Federal Reporter.
Of course, this development is not new. Reservations have been voiced for
many years about the proliferation of judicial opinions, legal commentary, and
the like. In 1962, a prominent attorney announced with horror that if all the
law books in Harvard Law School's library were aligned in a single row, they
would require a shelf thirty-nine miles long.2 The mind boggles at the
calculation of how long that shelf would be today. If these millions of printed
pages illuminated vistas, or if their sheer bulk served some other useful
purpose, I would gladly suffer the indignities of wading through them. But I
question whether the game is worth the candle.
At the risk of being called parochial, I confess that I am concerned both
about the contribution of the federal appellate judiciary to the oceans of paper
that have emerged and about the toll that producing that paper exacts. (I write
today in terms of the federal appellate judiciary-but the phenomena that worry
me are, I suspect, indigenous to most American appellate courts.) Perhaps the
most damning assessment of the output of the federal appellate bench is that of
Dean Roscoe Pound, who concluded as follows:
After reading upwards of fourteen hundred double-column pages of
judicial opinions, carefully sifted from many thousands of pages in the
National Reporter System, one is impelled to ask why paper, printer's ink,
labor, and shelfroom should be devoted to the perpetuation of what for the
* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit; B.A., Harvard College, 1955; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1958.
1 See Stewart v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 F.2d 147, 147 (1st Cir. 1939).
2 Eugene M. Prince, Law Books, Unlimited, 48 A.B.A. J. 134 (1962), excerpted in
APPELLATE JuDIcIAL OPINIONS 309, 310 (Robert A. Leflar ed., 1974).
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largest part is avowedly but repetition of things long familiar and is too often
merely elaborate elucidation of the obvious.3
Dean Pound put the point rather sharply, but the object of this essay is not so
much to answer his question as to echo the sentiments-rhetorical, in any
event-that prompted the question, and to make it clear that, in the years since
Dean Pound voiced his lament, the situation has deteriorated rather than
improved.
To be sure, the glut of appellate opinions can be viewed as just another
casualty of the litigation explosion. Complaints of a case load crisis are
commonplace, 4 and they seem well-founded. Despite creative attempts to prove
that this crisis is a figment of our collective imagination, 5 the everyday
experience of sitting federal judges and the best statistical analyses available
amply confirm the urgency of the situation.6 And while cases are proliferating
everywhere, they are multiplying most rapidly at the appellate level. The
pressure from beneath is building, with a growing base of district court cases,
and an even more drastically increasing rate of appeal. At the same time, the
top of the pyramid is unable to absorb any of the structural stress; the number
of cases heard by the Supreme Court remains at best constant, and the ratio of
appellate court dispositions to granted petitions for certiorari has dropped to an
all-time low. The remaining blocks of the pyramid, the circuit courts, are,
literally and figuratively, caught in the middle.
By accident or design, the federal appellate judiciary's institutional
response has mirrored what transpired earlier at the district court level. We
have resorted increasingly to case management techniques: settlement
3 APPELLATE JuDICAL OPINIONS, supra note 2, at 309 (quoting Roscoe Pound).
4 See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-93
(1985) (discussing increase in federal judicial business since 1960).
5 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and
Don't Know About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4
(1983); Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform:
Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 319 (1985).
6 For an intriguing example of the judicial perspective, see Abner J. Mikva, The Lester
W. Roth Lecture: For Whom Judges Write, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1357 (1988). For an
excellent, relatively recent statistical survey, see Vincent Flanagan, Appellate Court
Caseloads: A Statistical Overview (Sept. 14, 1989), in 2 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMrLrEE, WoRKING PAPERS AND SUBcOMMrrn REPORTS, pt. II-D (July 1, 1990). The
best recent compendiums of the conventional wisdom may be found in THE FEDERAL
APPELLATE JUDICIARY iN THE TwENTY-FasT CENTURY (Federal Judicial Ctr. ed., 1989)
[hereinafter JUDICIARY] and FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM1TrEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMlrrrEE (April 2,
1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT].
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programs, screening programs, "rocket" dockets, and the like.7 Many of these
innovations are laudable, but, like using one's fingers to plug a holed dike,
they have two shortcomings. First, we have only a limited number of fingers at
our disposal. Second, the inserting of fingers merely delays the adverse effects
of, rather than repairs, the structural weaknesses that caused the damage in the
first place. For the cases that reach the writing stage (of which there are far too
many), we are reduced to greater and greater dependence on the starry-eyed
post-adolescents whom we call law clerks. This system-if we can call it that-
lends itself to uncertainty, contradiction, and disuniformity. It also has a
tendency to transform judges from thinkers to managers. In the process, we
risk losing that precious commodity once thought to be our hallmark-the
opportunity for "the sober second thought." 8 Little wonder that the eminent
scholar, Paul Bator, devoted the last essay of his life to a plea for reform,
driven by the conviction that "at the court of appeals level, the appellate system
is malfunctioning." 9
All this is troubling, but, at least, it offers the small comfort of having a
familiar ring. There is, however, a less remarked aspect to the case load crisis:
the crisis of information overload. 10 If the case load crisis is descriptive of the
effect of more cases on the justice system, the "infoload" crisis limns the effect
of more cases on the vocation of the law.
In 1962, thirty-nine shelf miles of books was a noticeable but bearable
weight on the shoulders of the profession. Three decades later, the weight of
the law is oppressive. Even with pinpoint subspecialization, it has become a
half-time job for a lawyer to keep track of all the cases emerging on a daily
basis in his or her small corner of the law. Federal appellate judges, who, like
7 Because the reversal rate has dropped sharply, it can also be argued that the courts of
appeals have responded to increasing workloads by growing more deferential. I do not
agree. I think the lower reversal rate more likely reflects the fact that a greater percentage
of unmeritorious appeals are now being prosecuted. In the federal system, the appeal from
the district court to the court of appeals has become, regrettably, the best bargain in the
supermarket of modem litigation.
8 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25
(1936); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREmE
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmcs 26 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that "[Iheir insulation and the
marvelous mystery of time give courts... the opportunity for 'the sober second thought."'
(quoting Stone, supra)).
9 Paul M. Bator, What is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673,
678 (1990).
10 The few who have remarked upon the phenomenon include Judge Mikva and,
especially, Judge Gibbons. See John J. Gibbons, Maintaining Effective Procedures in the
Federal Appellate Courts, in JuDIcIARY, supra note 6 at 22, 22-28; Mikva, supra note 6, at
1360.
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it or not (and most of us relish the role), are compelled to function as
generalists, can do little more than read what they can (in-circuit slip opinions,
Supreme Court opinions, and United States Law Week alone absorb a high
percentage of the available hours), then pray that they have chosen dependable
clerks.
Much-heralded advances in technology have done little to ease the burdens.
A prominent economist has made the intriguing point that, historically,
household appliances advertised as "time-saving" have not saved time.'1 When
laundry became easier to do, standards of cleanliness rose concomitantly, and
consumers began to wash clothing at more frequent intervals.12 Computer
assisted legal research is much like laundry equipment in this respect. As cases
remotely on point become ever easier to find, the expectations for research rise,
courts crank out more opinions, lawyers write more briefs (citing more
opinions), and opinions cite more opinions. The cycle then begins anew. All
too often, the judges are drained.
To make matters worse, the quality of legal argumentation sometimes
seems to vary in inverse proportion to the rate of citation. There is a vicious
feedback effect between the infoload crisis and the case load crisis in its more
familiar aspect, for one exacerbates the other. Information overload unsettles
legal rights, because the assiduous associate can find support for any claim, no
matter how tendentious. One result is that attorneys bring more actions and
take appeals in a larger percentage of cases. Another result is that attorneys
seed their briefs with more reasons for appeal, each complete with a
compendium of authorities arguably in support of it. Judges proceed to decide
the appeals and, in conscientious turn, address more and more issues per
appeal. They then dutifully publish the resultant opinions, thereby contributing
to the surfeit of information.
Many solutions have been proposed to the case load crisis in its various
aspects, most being in the nature of structural reform. An American Bar
Association commission recommended various forms of subject matter
specialization, revitalized en banc procedures, and screening techniques. 13 The
Federal Courts Study Commission paid special attention to proposals for
administrative streamlining and jurisdictional limitation.14 Many of these
proposals are promising, but they will require time, money, and, in some
I1 JuuET B. SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERiCAN 87-88 (1992). The one exception
to the rule is the microwave oven. Id. at 88.
12 Id. at 88-89.
13 American Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements,
The United States Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of
Growth 41 (1989).14 FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 171-86.
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instances, legislative action. It seems to me that, while such reforms are in
gestation, there is a change we can bring about quickly and inexpensively,
through greater self-discipline. I believe that if the appellate judiciary were to
take a harder look at restricting publication, it would be a step in the right
direction.
Limited publication has several advantages. Most importantly, like other
demand-side solutions, it strikes directly at the infoload crisis. By contrast,
structural reforms improving the capacity of the courts to handle current loads
would serve to deepen the infoload crisis. Moreover, some of these structural
reforms will merely delay the inevitable. Add a few notches to his belt, and the
fat man will eat more; print more money, and the government will spend more;
make appellate judges specialists in narrow areas and, over time, there will be
more judges, who will, as a group, write more about their pet topics.
What makes curtailed publication one of the more appealing of the
demand-side solutions is that it takes effect at the source. Whereas limiting
jurisdiction merely puts a lid on the steam pipe, generating pressure that will
inevitably express itself in different forms of social conflict, limiting
publication amounts to limiting fuel production-reducing the amount of coal
with which the engine of litigation is stoked. Shortening published opinions,
even assuming that such a step is desirable and feasible, would refine the fuel,
but would not reduce the volume of its production.
When I speak of curtailed publication, I do not limit myself to conventional
print. If an opinion should not be published, it should not be published either
manually or electronically. To make an opinion available electronically defeats
the whole purpose of the enterprise. If citation is permitted, then the infoload
crisis worsens, and unfair advantage is bestowed on more affluent litigants. If
citation is not permitted, then the transmission of the opinion is at best a tease
and at worst an invitation to violate or evade the prohibitory rule. By now,
every legal researcher has experienced many times the allure of the forbidden.
In my view, then, the judiciary could take an important step in the right
direction by ceasing electronic dissemination of any opinion not released for
routine publication. The decision against electronic publication, after all, is (or
should be) based on exactly the same criteria as the decision against publication
altogether. 15
By advocating self-imposed limits on publication, I do not mean to suggest
that most cases should be terminated without opinion or by means of judgment
orders. Rather, I envision more cases being decided in one of two ways. First,
a far greater number of cases can be decided by means of full-dress opinions
15 A more radical step may merit consideration: the "depublication" of all existing
opinions that have been published only in electronic form. Similar action has been taken on
a large scale, for published opinions generally, in the California state court system.
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intended specifically and exclusively for the eyes of the parties, in a form that
is most commonly called the memorandum opinion. Memorandum opinions are
no less thorough in their probing of the parties' assertions, but they need not
rehearse the facts at great length, they need not collect cumulative citations for
the sake of completeness, and they need not take three steps backward to
survey the legal landscape, in the style of the great law reviews. In addition, I
fail to grasp why appellate courts so often feel compelled to reinvent the wheel.
In many cases, the district court has handed down a clear, complete opinion
(whether written or ore tenus does not matter) that cuts to the heart of the
matter. In most of those situations, it serves no purpose for a court of appeals
merely to rephrase the district court's words. In my estimation, many more
appeals can be concluded satisfactorily by affimance substantially on the basis
of the district court's opinion.
It may be useful to conceive of these approaches in terms of the three
standard judicial functions. Memorandum opinions and "based-on" affirmances
serve equally well the function of review for correctness, but they abandon (or,
better put, dismiss as unsuited for the particular case) the function of
developing the law in favor of the function of maintaining uniformity. Because
there exists a large class of cases that provide little opportunity for the
development of the law, increased use of memorandum opinions and based-on
affirmances would not entail a sacrifice of judicial effectiveness along any of its
three dimensions. In the short term, there would be a perceptible easing of the
Briarean task of keeping current in the law. Eventually, perhaps, there would
be an easing of the case load burden as well. And, as a by-product, appellate
judges would gain more time for study and contemplative thought in respect to
those opinions which will serve as beacons in the law.
There are four basic objections to limited publication, which double in
brass as arguments in favor of universal publication. First, there is a tendency
to sanctify publication as integral to the individual litigant's traditional "right to
full adjudication." 16 Second, some contend that nonpublication gives unfair
advantage to chronic suitors or other parties who take the trouble to obtain and
cite unpublished slip opinions, with the result that courts are misled as to the
weight and trend of existing precedent. 17 The third objection is that all opinions
must be in plain view, for the public eye polices the quality of judicial
craftsmanship. Knowing that their opinions will be scrutinized, as this thesis
holds, judges who publish are less likely to succumb to ennui or to ignore
complexities for the sake of convenience. 18 They are also less likely to rest
16 See Mikva, supra note 6, at 1360.
17 FCSC REPORT, supra note 6, at 130.
18 See POsNER, supra note 4, at 122-23; cf KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADmON 313 (1960) ("The candor which in a full opinion forbids ignoring an
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their decisions on normative grounds lying outside the broad social
consensus. 19 Finally, it is supposed that the vast majority of cases argued are
genuinely precedential-either because situations that make their way up to
appellate tribunals are by definition novel, or because the profusion of appeals
may be traced to the need for elaboration in new areas of the law. Even if there
exist some cases utterly lacking in precedential value, it is argued that judges
and their staffs lack the capacity to identify those cases before formulating their
views on paper.20 I find none of these objections persuasive.
Flag-waving aside, publication rarely has been perceived as part and parcel
of our jurisprudential heritage. Although a number of states in the nineteenth
century passed statutes mandating publication, this development appears to
have been driven by short-term political considerations and by resentment at
the extreme practice of issuing reversals without opinion.21 In any event, the
development has long since been arrested. The overwhelming majority of
courts have found those provisions to be nonbinding, objectionable,
unconstitutional, or otherwise undesirable. 22
The fairness concern, too, has little basis in reality. Differential access to
opinions deemed unworthy of publication could easily be blocked by a refusal
to release "not-for-publication" opinions to database proprietors, or by a hard
and fast rule against citation, rigorously enforced. Zero access is the most
evenhanded policy of all. Indeed, fairness may cut in the opposite direction.
Universal electronic publication would create a new fairness problem of
unimagined magnitude, because, for the foreseeable future, electronic databases
are available in practice only to relatively well-heeled litigants.
uncomfortable authority must scorn equally its disregard in silence by way of a Per
Curiam.").
19 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 124-57 (1990).
20 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 122-23.
21 Max Radin, The Requirement of Written Opinions, 18 CAL. L. REv. 486, 487, 490
(1930) (discussing California experience).
22 The seminal case is Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24 (1859) (Field, J.) (striking
down statute mandating publication and statement of reasons, appropriately enough, without
detailed statement of reasons). See also Vaughan v. Harp, 4 S.W. 751 (Ark. 1887); City of
Miami Beach v. Poindexter, 119 So. 136 (Fla. 1928); Baker v. Kerr, 13 Iowa. 384 (1862);
Ex parte Griffiths, 20 N.E. 513 (Ind. 1889); Farwell v. Laird, 51 P. 284 (Kan. 1897);
McCalls Ferry Power Co. v. Price, 69 A. 832 (Md. 1908); Turner v. Anderson, 139 S.W.
180 (Mo. 1911); State er. rel La France Copper Co. v. District Court, 105 P.721 (Mont.
1909); Stevens v. State, 76 N.W. 1055 (Neb. 1898); Homer v. Amick, 61 S.E. 40 (W. Va.
1908). But see Ayres v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 48 (1908); Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co.,
165 N.E. 93 (Ohio 1929); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry., 239 S.W.
919 (Tex. 1922).
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The remaining two objections are weightier. While openness and public
scrutiny are to be prized, I am not suggesting that opinions be issued in a dark
room at midnight, and immediately placed under seal. Unpublished opinions
would remain public records. Quality would be adequately assured by
professional pride, the vigilance of colleagues, and the possibility of further
review. Even now, these, rather than some hypothetical mass public, furnish
the primary checks on a judge's discretion. Moreover, if gains in quality result
from publicity-and that is debatable, for judges concerned about publicity are
often at risk of jeopardizing the detachment and impartiality that are so much a
part of the judicial role-those gains are overwhelmed by the losses attendant to
feeding the fires of the infoload crisis. The first premise of judicial reform of
any kind must be that justice on an individual basis has greatly diminished
value if it impairs the delivery of justice systemwide.
That leaves only the objection that the class of cases lacking precedential
value is tiny to nonexistent. I cannot rebut this point scientifically, and many
jurists might beg to differ, yet my decade on the bench has persuaded me that
there exists a sizable class of such cases. Few appeals that fall within that
category will be utterly devoid of worth. But for every instance in which such a
case sheds light, there may be ten or twenty in which it obfuscates. To
paraphrase Judge Gibbons, the accumulated wisdom of the ages took ages to
accumulate-not two weeks.23 I submit that, in the era of the infoload crisis,
the burden of persuasion should be on those who perceive pearls of wisdom in
every oyster.24
I recognize that proposing reduced publication of judicial opinions is likely
to prove simpler than accomplishing the goal. The suspicions of harried
lawyers to the contrary notwithstanding, judges are human. Each of us, after
committing our views about an appeal to paper, may well be struck by the
deathless quality of the prose, or convinced that the most humdrum rendition of
well-settled authority constitutes a landmark in the law. Fortunately, keen legal
minds have grappled with the problem since the early years of the century and
have developed several serviceable sets of guidelines to assist judges in
deciding when to refrain from publication. There are two basic approaches.
One looks to the nature of the decision reviewed; the other to the inherent value
of the reviewing decision.
The earliest set of guidelines I have encountered takes the first approach. In
a 1915 essay, Chief Justice John Winslow of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
23 Gibbons, supra note 10, at 27.
24 In deciding questions of publication vel non, it makes sense to err on the side of
caution. A decision not to publish is easily correctable. If experience proves the initial
judgment to be faulty, then the court may rectify the mistake by publishing the opinion at a
later date. But once the djinni is out of the bottle, it cannot readily be confined.
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advocated a strong presumption ("absent exceptional importance") against the
publication of affirmances in general, and a per se rule against publication of
routine affirmances, that is opinions involving only questions of fact, or
repastinating ground covered by existing precedent.25 The former Chief Judge
of the Third Circuit, Judge Ruggero Aldisert, has updated this approach to take
into account the existence of the administrative state and draws out the
approach's logic. In Judge Aldisert's view, an opinion should be published
when the judgment of the trial court is reversed (or, in the same vein, when a
petition to review an administrative agency action is granted). Conversely, an
opinion should not be published when the decision does no more than carry out
the appellate court's error-correcting function and affirms the judgment (or
enforces the order of an administrative agency).26
The alternative approach places greater emphasis on the attributes of the
reviewing decision itself. For instance, the Federal Judicial Center suggested
two decades ago that no appellate opinion should be published unless it lays
down a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule, criticizes existing
law, resolves an apparent conflict of authority, or involves a legal issue of
continuing public interest.27
The Seventh Circuit's current policy, which may be taken as the state of
the art, synthesizes the two approaches. On one hand, it adopts much of the
Federal Judicial Center's paradigm, while broadening the concept of intrinsic
value; on the other hand, it incorporates elements of the Winslow-Aldisert
approach, while modulating that approach to take into account the peculiar
institutional status of an intermediate appellate tribunal. In the Seventh Circuit:
A published opinion will be filed when the decision
(i) establishes a new, or changes an existing rule of law;
(ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest;
(iii) criticizes or questions existing law;
(iv) constitutes a significant and non-duplicative contribution to legal
literature
(A) by a historical review of law,
(B) by describing legislative history, or
(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law;
2 5 John B. Winslow, The Courts and the Papermills, 10 ILL. L. REV. 157, 161 (1915).
2 6 See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPMON WRrNG 21 (1990).
2 7 ADVISORY COUNCIL OF APPELLATE JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON USE OF
APPELLATE COURT ENERGIES, STANDARDS FOR PUBUICATION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONs (FIC
Research series No. 73-2, 1973), excerpted in APPELLATE JUDICIAL OPINONS, supra note 2,
at 314-19.
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(v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order when the lower
court or agency has published an opinion supporting the judgment or
order; or
(vi) is pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court and is not
rendered merely in ministerial obedience to specific directions of that
Court. 2 8
One can quarrel with these guidelines, but it is surpassingly difficult to quarrel
with the principle for which they stand. Stringent guidelines, meticulously
followed, coupled with a presumption against publication, would go a long way
toward reducing the infoload crisis. Unfortunately, as Judge Gibbons
accurately notes, even in circuits with strict rules on the books, the practical
criterion for publication is the amount of time that the judge puts into an
opinion. 29 The trick, of course, is self-discipline, for the most thoughtful set of
rules will not slow the stream of published opinions unless judges take the rules
to heart and pay them more than lip service.
To recapitulate, curtailing publication will do no harm-and it promises to
do some good. It will be welcomed by a diverse constituency, ranging from the
bleary-eyed to those who yearn for greater clarity in the law. It will also ensure
the quality of our developing jurisprudence. And it may be the last, best hope
of the appellate judiciary. Opinion writing is far from an exact science, and
good opinions, like well-made suits of clothes, are best when custom tailored.
The work is labor-intensive. Because published opinions require extra pains,
reducing the number of published opinions will allow judges to devote more
time and energy to the elucidation of important legal principles in cases that
warrant great care and contemplative thought.
Two centuries ago, Lord Mansfield lived by the following heroic maxim:
"I never give a judicial opinion upon any point, until I think I am master of
every material argument and authority relative to it." 30 In these more hectic
times, judges are faced with the choice of either reducing the number of full-
dress opinions or lowering the level of mastery to which they aspire. The better
choice is clear. Unless we are to defenestrate the ideal of Lord Mansfield-and
I think we all agree that we should cling to it-judges must begin to think more
and write less.
28 7th Cir. R. 53, reprinted in Aldisert, supra note 26, at 15-17.
29 Gibbons, supra note 10, at 26.
30 Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 339 (K.B. 1770).
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